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The effect of social capital is often overestimated because contacts and centrality can be a consequence
of success rather than its cause. Only rare randomized or natural experiments can assess the real causal
effect of social capital. This paper relies on data from one such experiment: faculty recruitment at theecruitment
etworks
ocial capital
cademia
ausality
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) between 1960 and 2005, a leading French institution
of higher education in the social sciences. It exploits the fact that the electoral commission, a hiring
committee which produces a ﬁrst ranking of applicants, is partly composed of faculty members drawn at
random. It shows that when the PhD advisor is randomly drawn, it doubles the chances of an applicant
of being shortlisted.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.“What has remained, however, and indeed has considerably
increased, is a factor peculiar to the university career. Whether
or not an adjunct lecturer, let alone an assistant, ever succeeds
in achieving the position of a full professor, let alone of a head
of an institute, is a matter of pure chance. Of course, chance is
not the only factor, but it is an usually powerful factor.”
Weber (2008, p. 28)
The role played by social networks and personal contacts in
etting a job is one of sociology’s most famous propositions
Granovetter, 1973, 1974). Indeed, labor surveys have shown
epeatedly that an important fraction of the population in devel-
ped countries cites contacts as a reason they were hired in their
urrent jobs (Marsden and Gorman, 2001; Ioannides and Loury,
004). In the United States, half of the workers interviewed in the
978 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics heard of their
urrent job from a friend or a relative and 40% of the men and
ne third of the women surveyed thought there was someone who
ay have helped (Corcoran et al., 1980). Moreover, one fourth of
nemployed jobseekers surveyed in a 1992 study indicated that
hey had checked during the previous four weeks with friends and
elatives to ﬁnd work (Ports, 1993). In France, 20–25 percent of
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ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.02.002
378-8733/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.respondentswhohad been recently hired stated in Labor Force sur-
veys taken between 2005 and 2012 that they “entered their ﬁrm”
thanks to “family, personal or professional contacts” (Larquié (de)
and Rieucau, 2015).
Yet despite the widespread view that personal contacts—and
particularly weak ties—often facilitate job ﬁnding, the empirical
evidence for a clear link between social networks and employment
outcomes is limited. Some studies have found that weak ties can
affect outcomes, either as a consequence of information gleaned
from weak ties about job opportunities (Fernandez and Weinberg,
1997; Yakubovich, 2005) or as a result of the indirect inﬂuence that
weak ties can have on people in charge of recruitment decisions
(Lin et al., 1981). And there is strong evidence for the importance
of strong ties, especially in countries likeChinawhere labormarkets
are not very competitive (Bian, 1997; Obukhova, 2012). People in
charge of recruitment may therefore have great motivation to use
their discretionary power in favor of the closest candidates.
However, studies based on large samples are much less conﬁ-
dent about the causal impact of contacts on job opportunities. The
ﬁrst-order correlation between job contacts and professional out-
comes disappears once a set of elementary controls is introduced
and relationships are tested that extend beyond subsamples of
white upper-classmales (Bridges and Villemez, 1986). They also go
down after the correlation between the characteristics of individ-
uals and the characteristics of their contacts is taken into account
(Mouw, 2003). In Mouw’s broad survey of the literature on the
causal effects of social capital (2006) he argues that there is actually
little empirical evidence demonstrating a link between contacts
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nd job outcomes. He points to unobserved heterogeneity and
everse causality—twoclassic sources of bias, that aremore likely to
ccur with network variables—as potentially leading to substantial
verestimation of the impact of networks. He forcefully advo-
ates for methods, such as natural experiments and randomized
xperiment techniques, which can overcome the current statistical
imitations. Two previous studies based on such methods do in fact
onclude that social capital hardly plays any role in job outcomes
Mouw, 2003; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006).
If it is in fact true that social network variables mainly cap-
ure confounding variables like skills or successes (either past or
nticipated), this ﬁnding would be of dramatic importance for net-
ork sociology. Indeed, it should lead us to seriously reconsider
very important stream of theoretical and empirical literature in
ociology (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Lin et al., 1981; Burt, 1992,
005; FernandezandWeinberg, 1997; Lin, 2001;Yakubovich, 2005;
bukhova, 2012). But while there are strong reason’s to support
ouw’s general critique of ﬁndings based on statistical estima-
ions that neglect the aforementioned biases, at the same time
here are reasons to think that Mouw’s studies should not lead to a
eﬁnitive conclusion about the effects of networks. The technique
uoted by Mouw (2006), based on random assignment of students
n campuses’ dormitories, may not be the best natural experiment
o assess the pure causal impact of social capital on recruitment. So
efore throwing out the sociological baby with the methodological
ath water, we need to apply a more convincing causal method-
logy to situations where contacts or positions in the network are
ore likely to make a difference.
Randomized experiments are expensive and difﬁcult to imple-
ent for most real-life situations, including job recruitment. In
ocial sciences, most randomized experiments are run in the ﬁelds
f public policy research or development economics (Banerjee and
uﬂo, 2011). Natural experiments that could be used to learn more
bout the causal impact of networks on recruitment are unfortu-
ately rare.
The only existing natural experiment in the literature is a recent
tudy of recruitment in Spain (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015). In
rder to ameliorate a widespread perception of academic inbreed-
ng (i.e. the tendency for universities to preferentially recruit their
ormer PhD students), the Spanish Education Ministry required
rom 2002 to 2006 the randomization of the composition of
cademic hiring committees for the ﬁrst round of academic recruit-
ent. The presence of such a natural experiment allows Zinovyeva
ndBagues toplausibly claimthat thepresenceofpersonal contacts
ncreases the chance of recruitment.
However, there are still several limits to this study. First, the
tudy is not informedby any clear theory, sociological or otherwise,
orwhywe should expect personal contacts to inﬂuence outcomes.
ndeed, the study does not engage with forty years of research into
he effects of personal ties.
Second, the study does not situate its ﬁndings within the par-
icular cultural and political context that produced the natural
xperiment. Spanish universities are widely perceived as being
nﬂuenced by a particular form of parochial nepotismunique to the
panish context, and it cannot be assumed that an effect observed
n this particular academic settingwould necessarily also be gener-
lizable to a wider array of European universities, and particularly
lite institutionswhere academic leaders claim to be on the cutting
dge of social scientiﬁc research, and therefore less inﬂuenced by
arochial ties.
The recruitment of scholars at the École des Hautes Études en
ciences Sociales (EHESS), a leading French institution of higher
ducation in the social sciences, provides a natural experiment
hat allows us to measure the causal effect of social networks at
ne of Europe’s most elite academic institutions. Assessing recruit-
ent in this setting will allow us to assess the scope of previouslyrks 46 (2016) 60–75 61
observed effects of social capital on academic recruitment. Firmly
rooted in the four decade long sociological inquiry into the effects
of social ties, this article uses the presence of the natural experi-
ment at EHESS to conduct a theoretically informed estimation of
the precise causal effect of social capital on placement outcomes
within an elite educational institution.
The EHESShiring procedure requires that two-thirds of the elec-
toral commission providing the initial rankings for applicants be
drawn at random from the institution’s faculty. Thanks to the ran-
dom component built into the selection process, we can apply
the classical experimental feature comparing the outcomes of two
groups: (a) the treated group, i.e., the applicants whose personal
contact has been randomly drawn; and (b) the control group, i.e.,
the applicants whose personal contact has not been randomly
drawn. The difference in the outcome between these two groups
will indicate the effect of having a social contact on the committee.
I exploit this feature for several types of personal “contacts” that
are persons with whom the applicant is likely to have signiﬁcantly
interacted in academia before applying. It includes, for instance, the
applicant’s PhD advisor, other members of their PhD committee,
their coauthors, and other persons who had the same PhD advisor.
As the article shows, when one of the randomly drawn commit-
tee members is the PhD advisor for a given candidate, it doubles
the odds of that candidate being put forward for recruitment by
the electoral commission. The inﬂuence of chance here is a chance
of inﬂuence: the chance to have your contacts in the right place
in order to inﬂuence an outcome in your favor. In this regard, the
status of the university turns out to hardly be a mitigating factor.
Academics at elite universities claiming to be at the forefront of
scholarshipmay be just as susceptible to parochialism as any other.
In sum, the article provides strong evidence that social capital
matters for academic recruitment. This resultmay be reassuring for
the sociologist who coined the term, as well as the many sociolo-
gists who have spent much of their careers researching the effects
of social ties. But at the same time it may be discomforting for
many academic institutions whose methods of selection may devi-
ate quite substantially from the meritocratic and universalist ideal
of the university (Merton, 1973).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The ﬁrst sec-
tion details the shortcomings of classical estimations of the causal
impact of social capital. The second section establishes links
between the EHESS study and previous studies of the academic
labor market. The third section presents the data and the method. I
present the results in the fourth section, andﬁnishwithadiscussion
of their scope and limitations.
1. Natural experiments on social capital
In network sociology, it has beenvery commonsince theworkof
Granovetter (1974) and Burt (1992) to use a basic regression analy-
sis to try to explain an outcome (getting a job or a promotion, level
of pay or pay increase) through the use of social capital variables.
Social capital variables generally constitute either the “who” type
of social capital (who you know, the inﬂuence of a speciﬁc contact)
or the “where” type of social capital (where you are in the network
in terms of centrality, structural constraint, etc.).
Mouw (2006) concentrates his criticism on the “who” type
of social capital. Building on the research into peer effects con-
ducted by the econometrician Manski (1993), Mouw shows that
regressions seeking to evaluate the inﬂuence of a speciﬁc con-
tact are particularly vulnerable to the “reﬂection problem.” Since
homophily is considered to be a universal feature of social rela-
tionships (McPherson et al., 2001; Lin, 2001), one can expect the
presence of a strong correlation between an individual’s char-
acteristics and those of their contact, both on the observable
dimensions, which can be controlled for in regressions, and the
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nobservable dimensions which cannot be addressed. The unob-
erved heterogeneity, which is often present, may  lead researchers
o overestimate the impact of having a personal contact.
Let us consider an example. Combes et al. (2008) test how appli-
ant rankings in economics in the Agrégation du supérieur, a national
ompetitive exam for university professors in France, are affected
y applicants’ links to members of the hiring committee, including
he presence of a former PhD advisor, or a member of the same
epartment on the committee. The authors ﬁnd a strong correla-
ion between such links and the probability of an applicant being
ired. However, since the French government chooses members
f the committee, they presumably are talented in their ﬁeld. And
he homophilous patterns of relationships would suggest that their
ontacts (especially former PhD candidates) are similarly talented.
he authors do control for talent variables, including the number
nd quality of publications by both applicants and their respec-
ive advisors, and the possession of a position or PhD from one of
he top six universities for economics in France. Nevertheless, the
eaching talent that also strongly contributes to the exam result
emains unobserved in the study. If members of the jury are tal-
nted teachers and are assortatively matched with contacts equally
alented on that dimension, the coefﬁcient of the tie variable could
erve more to measure this unobserved talent than to measure the
ausal effect of having a tie in the jury. The importance of social
apital could therefore be overestimated.
It is true that Mouw does not discuss much of the “where”
ype of social capital, a term that is used in this paper to describe
ocial capital that is approximated by a network aggregate mea-
ure such as centrality (Freeman, 1979) or a structural constraint
Burt, 1992).1 As the characteristics of the contacts and their spe-
iﬁc roles are not known, it is difﬁcult to say a priori whether
he “reﬂection problem” plays an equivalent role here. But one
ust pay attention to the fact that measures such as centrality
nd structural constraint—although traditionally cited as causes of
uccess—are also a consequence of past success: people want to
onnect to the most successful people as a way of sharing their
tatus (Gould, 2002; Barabási and Albert, 1999). Moreover, those
lready in a network of successful people may  hear about promis-
ng people by word of mouth before they achieve public success
Menger, 2002). This means that promising or successful people
ay  be more likely to have a larger personal network and to appear
ore central. Regressing success on network centrality or on struc-
ural constraint can lead to suspicions of reverse causality because
etwork aggregate measures can be viewed as either gauges of past
uccess or indicators that a person’s future success is anticipated.
Mouw suggests several ways to overcome the difﬁculty of using
raditional econometric methods to properly identify the causal
mpact of social capital. These include individual ﬁxed effects
Mouw, 2003; Yakubovich, 2005; Chen and Volker, 2016), which
an control for time constant individual heterogeneity (but not for
ime changing unobserved covariates), and exogenous instrumen-
al variables, provided that such variables are really exogenous (a
haracteristic difﬁcult to prove). He therefore strongly advocates
or the most reliable research design, natural experiments (or ran-
omized experiments, if possible), in which a random dispatch
llows one to compare, as in the classic double-blind experiment
f pharmacology, the difference in outcomes for two  randomly
rawn groups: those receiving the treatment and those receiving a
lacebo.
For instance, several papers have used the fact that many
niversities randomly assign students to two-person rooms and
1 Ron Burt’s structural constraint is a measure of direct connection of one’s per-
onal ties. It is negatively correlated with the brokerage opportunities offered by
tructural holes.rks 46 (2016) 60–75
dormitories in order to enhance diversity. This random match can
also serve as a natural experiment to estimate social capital effects
(Sacerdote, 2001; Marmarosa and Sacerdote, 2002; Zimmerman,
2003). For instance, it has been used to compare the fate of stu-
dents whose roommates were among the top 25 percent of the
distribution of a pre-university scholastic test (treatment) to the
control group, whose roommates were more ordinary and fell into
the two  middle quartiles (Sacerdote, 2001). The former group had
an undergraduate grade point average 0.047 higher (0.026 standard
deviation) than the latter. If roommate assignments were really
made at random, this means that the effect was independent of
any other observed or unobserved variable and that the estimation
avoided the classic unobserved heterogeneity bias.
Based on the rare cases where such methods are
possible—usually involving roommate assignments on Ameri-
can college campuses (Sacerdote, 2001; Marmarosa and Sacerdote,
2002)—Mouw (2006) ﬁnds that there is little to no effect,
concluding his article with the following pessimistic statement:
If individuals choose friends who  are similar to them, then one
may  reasonably suspect that the effects of many social capital
variables are overestimated because of unobserved, individual-
level factors that are correlated with friendship choice and
the outcome variable of interest. This is not an argument that
social capital does not matter, but merely a suspicion that many
existing empirical estimates of the effect of social capital are
not much of an improvement over our intuition or anecdotal
conviction that it does matter. Overall, the evidence reviewed
here suggests that when the problem of endogenous friend-
ship choice is taken into account by a method that attempts
to deal with it explicitly, the resulting estimates of social capital
effects are modest in size, ranging from essentially zero for the
majority of the estimates using randomly assigned roommates
to the small, but signiﬁcant, coefﬁcients reported in ﬁxed effects
models of peer effects in education or juvenile delinquency.
For the numerous studies that use network variables as exoge-
nous variables, such a conclusion could seem rather severe. Perhaps
the strong net correlation is due to endogeneity? Before we accept
a conclusion that is so damaging to the established understand-
ing of networks within network sociology, we should recall that
the college roommate tie may  not be the most appropriate site
for studying the impact of a network. First, this type of tie is
rather heterogeneous, ranging from very close relationships to
distant and even conﬂicting ones. Second, although the evidence
found by the ﬁrst studies on random roommates assignments was
weak (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006), the presence of peer
effects was more convincingly conﬁrmed using similar methods in
very different environments, including French secondary education
(Goux and Maurin, 2007) and Indian engineering school (Hasan and
Bagde, 2013). Third, roommate relationships have little connection
to the professional and work environment, the domain of interest
in most of the research on the impact of social capital.
2. The role of mentorship in academic careers
In contrast to some labor markets where network inﬂuence in
hiring is seen as having a neutral or even positive effect in terms
of efﬁciency, the fact that contacts and networks play a role in aca-
demic labor markets is not generally viewed as valuable. Merton
(1973) has shown that the scholarly community developed faith
in a set of norms that govern or at least should ideally govern
the academic world: communalism, disinterestedness, originality,
organized skepticism, and universalism. The last of these assumes
that scientiﬁc claims will not “depend on the personal or social
attributes of their protagonists” (p. 270) and “ﬁnds further expres-
sion in the demand that careers be open to talents” (p. 273). Some
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tudies stress that contacts do have a globally positive role in the
evelopment of ideas (Collins, 1998; Wuchty et al., 2007). How-
ver, most of them question the extent to which universalism and
articularism govern real academic labor markets (Long and Fox,
995) while studying how personal relations correlate with indi-
idual outcomes such as grants, publications, wages, and jobs (Long
t al., 1979; Reskin, 1979; Cameron and Blackburn, 1981; Long
nd McGinnis, 1985; Godechot and Mariot, 2004; Leahy, 2007;
irchmeyer, 2005; Combes et al., 2008; Zinovyeva and Bagues,
015; Lütter and Schröder, 2014).2
One common ﬁnding of quantitative studies on academic
areers is that productivity—generally measured by the number
f publications—is at best a very partial predictor of academic
areers (Hargens and Hagstrom, 1967; Long et al., 1979; Long and
cGinnis, 1981; Leahy, 2007). The commencement and advance-
ent of an academic career seems to correlate more with the
roductivity and prestige of the mentor and that of the doctoral
epartment than with indicators of individual scientiﬁc productiv-
ty (Long et al., 1979; Reskin, 1979; Long and McGinnis, 1981). Most
tudies insist on the overwhelming importance of a sponsor or a
entor, and in particular the PhD advisor (Reskin, 1979; Cameron
nd Blackburn, 1981; Long and McGinnis, 1985). Future productiv-
ty is therefore more a consequence of contextual effects than of
nitial talent (Long and McGinnis, 1981).
Studies on academic careers in the United States generally
ocus on long-term outcomes such as career advancement or
ages among a set of scholars who have generally succeeded in
etting at least their ﬁrst job in the academic system after the
hD (Hargens and Hagstrom, 1967; Long et al., 1979; Long and
cGinnis, 1981; Leahy, 2007). But these studies usually fail to
nvestigate properly the role played by social capital at the entrance
o the academy. Analyzing the European state competitive exams
aken upon entrance to an academic career can help to enrich previ-
us studies by focusing on two elements that are often overlooked:
he possibility of comparing PhDs who succeed to those who  fail,
nd the opportunity to delve more deeply into the social capital
echanisms (direct support or indirect prestige) by which a spon-
or may  help a PhD to get a job. In the French political science ﬁeld,
hDs beneﬁt from the social capital of their advisor and that of their
hD committee. The number of contacts and the importance of the
tructural holes of the members of a PhD committee within the net-
ork of PhD committees are a predictor of the probability that PhDs
ill enter an academic career—a result interpreted by the authors
s an indicator of greater efﬁciency in the diffusion of a reputation
ithin a community (Godechot and Mariot, 2004). It is likely, how-
ver, that sponsorship becomes effective not only through indirect
fforts at promoting the candidate, but also when the applicant
as a sponsor on the hiring committee itself. In their study of the
grégation du supérieur, Combes et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the presence
f a person’s PhD advisor on the hiring committee has a strong
ositive impact on the likelihood of that person getting hired, one
quivalent to the candidate having written ﬁve additional articles.
hey also ﬁnd that the presence of colleagues from the applicant’s
wn department has a moderate impact. However, the authors ﬁnd
o signiﬁcant impact if the hiring committee includes either other
aculty from the applicant’s doctoral university or coauthors of the
pplicant’s PhD advisor. Zinovyeva and Bagues ﬁnd very similar
2 In his famous book Getting a Job,  Mark Granovetter (1974: 16) gives a striking
xample of the importance of contacts in academia that ﬁts much more with the
otivation-focused strong-tie framework than the information-focused weak-tie
ne: “One postdoctoral student in biology received a letter from an institution to
hich he had applied for a job, saying that there were ‘no openings for an indi-
idual with your qualiﬁcations.’ But when his thesis adviser took a position there,
he younger man went along as a research associate; he subsequently received an
ffusive letter expressing the college’s delight at his appointment.”rks 46 (2016) 60–75 63
results in their study of the ﬁrst step in academic recruitment of
university professors (catedrático de universidad) and associate pro-
fessors (profesor titular de universidad) for all disciplines in Spain
from 2002 to 2006: the strongest effect, tripling the odds of recruit-
ment, comes from the presence of the PhD advisor on the selection
committee. This effect is followed by the presence of an applicant’s
coauthor, a colleague from the same university, or another member
of the PhD committee (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015, Table A1).
Although scholars acquainted with an applicant may  sometimes
adopt rules to limit the inﬂuence of personal bias by, for example,
remaining silent during an ofﬁcial meeting to discuss the appli-
cant’s qualiﬁcations (Lamont, 2009), they still usually participate
in the ﬁnal vote. And even when a professor with a personal con-
nection to a particular candidate wants to remain silent, their
colleagues on the committee still usually solicit their opinions,
since they are likely to have the most information on that appli-
cant. Moreover, abstaining or resigning from a hiring committee
when one knows an applicant (a situation very common in aca-
demic “small worlds”) can often be paralyzing for a committee. In
the recruitment exam of the CNRS (Center National de la Recherche
Scientiﬁque/National Center for Scientiﬁc Research) in France, for
example, the members of the hiring committee requested to resign
in only a limited number of cases, such as when an applicant is a
current or former family member, the object of a strong love or hate
relationship, a supervisor, or someone with whom the committee
member has a notorious conﬂict. In fact, it is not unusual for a previ-
ous advisee to be among the applicants to a position, a situation that
is all the more common in institutions where inbred applicants are
allowed to compete (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015). The existence
of persistent biases in favor of former PhD advisees—biases which
have been documented in previous literature—might help explain
the high levels of academic inbreeding that have been documented
across many countries (Horta, 2013).
Academic inbreeding was very common in the United States
until the late 1970s (Eells and Cleveland, 1935a,b; Hargens and Farr,
1973), and has continued to be observed in law schools (Eisenberg
and Wells, 2000). Hargens (1969), for instance, found a rate of
inbred scholars in the United States of 15 percent at the end of the
ﬁfties, a number that is comparable to the one percent that would
have prevailed had recruitment been independent from the uni-
versity of origin. While most departments in the United States have
now established formal and informal rules banning the recruitment
of scholars who hold doctoral degrees from the same institution
(Han, 2003), academic inbreeding remains substantial in many
countries in Europe and in Mexico, at least at the beginning of the
academic career (Horta, 2013; Horta et al., 2010; Zinovyeva and
Bagues, 2015).
Godechot and Louvet (2010a) have shown that in France dur-
ing the 1980s, inbred PhDs were 17 times more likely to get hired
than outbred PhDs. Moreover, most such studies have shown, usu-
ally through a university of origin ﬁxed effect, that inbred scholars
are less productive scientiﬁcally (Horta, 2013; Horta et al., 2010;
Eisenberg and Wells, 2000; Eells and Cleveland, 1935a). The classic
model of sponsorship by an advisor could therefore have important
consequences for patterns of recruitment in the academic labor
market because it would contribute to the phenomenon of aca-
demic inbreeding. Based on advisor mobility, Godechot and Louvet
(2010b) seem to indicate that the presence of advisors on hiring
committees could be responsible for one-fourth to one-third of the
incidence of academic inbreeding.
Most of these studies indicate that on academic labor mar-
kets, contacts count, with the advisor–advisee contact holding a
particular signiﬁcance. Nevertheless, one must not forget Mouw’s
critique that the role of social capital can be overestimated because
of statistical methods that do not properly handle reverse causal-
ity or unobserved heterogeneity. The fact that early career success
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being elected by the assembly: 87 percent of those who achieved a4 O. Godechot / Social N
s more related to an applicant’s doctoral department or advisor’s
roductivity and prestige than any observable differences in merit
ossessed by the applicant might be explained, for instance, by
n improper measure of academic talent. An interesting concept
ike visibility—the fact that “people know your name, are familiar
ith your work, and think highly of your intellectual contributions”
Leahy, 2007, p. 537)—has been coined as a form of social capital.
ut since it is measured through citation counts it can be difﬁcult
o identify properly and to distinguish its effect from that of qual-
ty. As we have seen with Combes et al. (2008), most studies on the
ole of contacts rest on classical regressions and do not fully address
he endogeneity issue. Godechot and Mariot (2004) deal with this
roblem by using the usual PhD committee set up by a PhD advisor
s an instrument for the PhD committee set up for the observed
andidate.
This strategy may  account for some, but presumably not all, of
he possible endogeneity measurement problems. Zinovyeva and
agues (2015) developed a very similar estimation at the same
ime the present paper was  being written, based on a similar nat-
ral experiment in Spain: from 2002 to 2006, in all disciplines,
he ﬁrst step of the recruitment of university professors and asso-
iate professors was evaluated by a jury drawn at random from
he members of a given discipline. Strikingly similar results were
ound from our analysis of the French EHESS between 1961 and
005. This similarity led us to believe that the phenomenon of
ocial network inﬂuence over hiring patterns extends beyond the
nstitutional framework studied, and may  be quite present within
uropean Academia.
. Recruitment at EHESS: electoral procedure, methods,
nd data
What would become the EHESS was founded in 1948 as the
ixth “section” of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE), a
rench doctoral school in social sciences. Its chief boosters were
harles Morazé, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, historians of
he “annals” school, which advocated strongly for interdisciplinary
esearch (Mazon, 1988). Initial faculty at the school came from
our main disciplines: history, sociology, anthropology, and eco-
omics. The school continued to focus on these four disciplines
n subsequent years, even as it expanded into other social science
isciplines such as literature, linguistics, geography, psychology,
hilosophy, law, and area studies. In 1975, the sixth section became
ndependent from the EPHE and Paris University and was renamed
he École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).3 This
nstitution rapidly became one of the most famous institutions in
he French social sciences, hiring scholars such as Braudel, Legoff,
nd Furet in history; Bourdieu, Touraine, and Boltanski in sociol-
gy; Lévi-Strauss, Héritier, and Descola in anthropology; Barthes
nd Genette in literature; and Guesnerie, Bourguignon, Tirole and
iketty in economics. EHESS also hired scholars who were both
uch less famous than the above list of prestigious academics and
lso much less productive in terms of publication; and some of
hese lesser known scholars actively supervised numerous PhDs.
.1. A form of recruitment both speciﬁc and general
EHESS promoted new forms of teaching (the research seminar)
nd new ways of organizing knowledge (notably around area stud-
es), as well as new forms of research that valued interdisciplinary
xchange. The school also adopted a special recruitment procedure
3 The name EHESS will be used throughout this paper for simplicity, although this
esignation is correct only after 1975.rks 46 (2016) 60–75
called “election” that continues to contribute strongly to its iden-
tity. Although the election procedure might seem speciﬁc, it has
features that are common to many other academic institutions.
First, the procedure is interdisciplinary. Apart from a few excep-
tions, open positions are described by neither discipline nor topic.
Rather than being hired by a single-discipline jury, applicants are
nominated by a full faculty assembly vote. Consequently, if they are
to be successfully recruited, applicants must be convincing beyond
their own  discipline, a pattern also found by Lamont (2009) in the
allocation of postdoc grants by an interdisciplinary committee.
Second, the election process involves neither formal job talks
nor auditions; applicants simply submit a research proposal and
teaching project. However, in practice, it is still common for appli-
cants to visit—privately, if possible—with the EHESS president, the
members of the EHESS governing bureau, and some key mem-
bers of the faculty. Consequently, if applicants are to be elected,
they need faculty members who will campaign actively on their
behalf and convince other electors of their merits. Most of this
support activity is informal and difﬁcult to observe, but traces of
faculty advocacy for particular candidates have been recorded in
the archives. The meeting minutes provide fairly systematic evi-
dence that the names of recommenders were mentioned during
deliberations, and that some letter writers supported their candi-
dates publicly during faculty assemblies. Scholars are expected to
be sufﬁciently knowledgeable and generalist to evaluate applicants
beyond the boundaries of their own  respective disciplines.
Third, because the evaluation of applicants is both time-
consuming and costly, the EHESS has used an electoral commission
to more thoroughly evaluate applicants since the early ﬁfties. The
commission consists of 20–32 members of the EHESS faculty and,
beginning in 1975, has been assisted by an EHESS reviewer; since
1987, an external reviewer has also been included. Until 1997,
members of the EHESS that were not part of the electoral commis-
sion were allowed to step in during the meeting to say a few words
in favor of one or another applicant. The EHESS president also has
a say in which applicants are worth hiring and speaks on behalf
of the school’s governing bureau, whose associates, by statute, are
also members of the electoral commission. At the end of the dis-
cussion, the electoral commission will rank the applicants, usually
through a one-round vote. This indicative ranking is very inﬂu-
ential and is announced at the opening of the faculty assemblies
devoted to recruitment. Applicants obtaining an absolute majority
from the ﬁrst round are put forward,4 followed by other applicants
in decreasing order of votes. Unless a faculty member speciﬁcally
requests it, applicants who did not receive any votes in the elec-
toral commission will not be discussed in the full faculty meeting.
The internal reviewer presents only applicants who have some sup-
port from the electoral commission. Additional declared supporters
then speak in their favor. Multiple rounds of voting follow the dis-
cussion. The applicants receiving the highest number of votes are
then offered a position.
The electoral commission therefore plays a similar role to that
of the hiring or personnel committees at many American univer-
sities, which conduct an initial evaluation of applicants before a
vote by the full faculty. The commission result constitutes a sort of
straw poll, establishing a list of applicants worthy of concentrated
support and votes during the assembly. Applicants with majority
support from the electoral commission have a very high chance ofmajority at the ﬁrst stage were ultimately elected, versus a 5 per-
cent election rate for the rest of the candidate pool. Still, the faculty
4 It must be noted that the combination of one-round votes and absolute major-
ity  criteria may  sometimes lead the electoral commission to put forward fewer
applicants than the number of open positions.
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Table  1
Composition of electoral commissions.
Assistant professors Professors
Composition Presence Composition Presence
Total size (including substitutes) 33.83
(6.05)
28.48
(3.24)
Effective size (excluding substitutes/including present
substitutes)
28.00
(4.30)
25.5
(5.38)
24.16
(3.06)
21.61
(4.26)
Bureau including president 5.43
(1.19)
4.97
(0.82)
5.13
(1.42)
4.61
(1.15)
Scientiﬁc council 6.57
(4.75)
5.56
(4.54)
3.56
(2.98)
3.02
(2.81)
Randomly drawn members including substitutes 22.67
(4.64)
20.09
(3.44)
Substitutes
(randomly drawn/present)
5.83
(3.21)
1.56
(1.58)
4.32
(1.46)
1.58
(1.45)
Effective numbers of randomly drawn members (excluding
substitutes/including present substitutes)
16.83
(3.59)
14.97
(4.91)
15.77
(3.49)
13.84
(5.34)
Number of competitive exams 30 32 79 99
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eote: The average electoral commission for the assistant professor exam has 33.8 m
rawn  titular members, and 5.8 randomly drawn substitutes. Standard deviation in
ssembly does not automatically validate the electoral commis-
ion’s choices. One time out of every eight, the assembly contradicts
he electoral commission, most generally in the case of applicants
ho were put forward but did not achieve a strong majority. While
8 percent of the applicants with 50–60 percent of the votes dur-
ng the electoral commission were ultimately elected, those close
o the majority at the ﬁrst stage (i.e. those receiving 40–50 per-
ent of the votes), still had a 42 percent chance of ultimately being
lected.
.2. The random dimension of the electoral commission
Let us now turn to an interesting feature of the electoral commis-
ion for testing the causal impact of social capital: its composition.
ince 1961, the EHESS has drawn most of the members of its two
lectoral commissions (one for assistant professors, the other for
rofessors) at random from the faculty assembly. It is therefore pos-
ible to compare applicants whose contacts were drawn to those
pplicants whose contacts were not drawn.
However, before proceeding, we must account for some
omplexities in what is otherwise a quasi-experimental setting
Table 1). First, one-third of the commission consists of statutory
embers: the president of the EHESS, the four or ﬁve members of
is or her bureau, and the EHESS members of the scientiﬁc council,
ho are elected for terms of four to ﬁve years. These nonrandom
embers of the commission may  possess some special unobserved
haracteristics (such as administrative, scientiﬁc, and/or political
alent) that favored their election as president, bureau member,
r scientiﬁc council delegate, leading to the fear that applicants
n contact with those ex-ofﬁcio commission members could share
heir unobserved characteristics and that this relationship could
able 2
econstitution of electoral commissions.
Number of competitive exams 
Electoral commission records Asst. prof. Prof. Total 
Composition and presence 24 70 94 
Composition only 5 7 12 
Presence only 8 29 37 
Subtotal 37 106 143 
Composition known, results of EC unknown 15 35 50 
Composition unknown 3 10 13 
Total  55 151 206 
ote: Twenty-four assistant professor exams recorded both composition and presence a
lected.s: 5.4 members of the bureau, 6.6 members of the scientiﬁc council, 16.8 randomly
thesis.
explain their eventual recruitment. Therefore, we  must make sure
that such contacts do not bias our estimation of the effect of social
capital. I add therefore a variable to control for contacts who  hap-
pen to be ex-ofﬁcio members of the electoral commission. But I do
not interpret this variable causally, as membership in this group is
not randomly assigned.
A second complexity is the fact that substitutes are also drawn
at random to replace titular drawn members that are not able
to attend the electoral commission meeting. Since membership
depends on the nonrandom decision of the titular member whether
to sit out the electoral commission, the chance any substitute has
of sitting on the commission is lower than that of a titular (drawn)
member and is not totally random. To add a third complexity, there
is a signiﬁcant difference between the theoretical size of the elec-
toral commission and its effective size. This complication stems
from unexpected absences that even the use of substitutes cannot
remedy completely. On the one hand, contacts wanting to promote
applicants are probably more effective if they are present at the
meeting; so social capital might be better measured if we  analyze
effective presence rather than composition. On the other hand, the
decision of attending the meeting is not random, and this may bias
the results. In order to avoid those two last biases, then, my  regres-
sions are based on the commission composition, which could be
viewed as the intention to treat effect, rather than meeting presence,
which could be viewed as the treatment on treated effect.
In a fourth complexity, although the records are of very good
quality for a French academic institution overall, there are some
holes (Table 2): The results of the electoral commission were not
available for one-third of the exams. Of the remaining exams, com-
position and presence were recorded for two-thirds of the exams,
presence for only one-fourth, and composition for only one-tenth.
Number of applications Number of elected applicants
Asst. prof. Prof. Total Asst. Prof. Prof. Total
543 796 1339 85 196 281
156 154 310 15 32 47
274 286 560 25 72 97
973 1236 2209 125 300 425
336 325 661 85 98 183
27 69 96 17 16 33
1336 1630 2966 227 414 641
t the electoral commission. 543 applications were recorded and 85 persons were
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Table 3
Types of links investigated.
Number of
links in EHESS
Number of links
drawn in EC
Number of links
undrawn in EC
Number of
applications with
links in EHESS
Number of
applications with
links drawn in EC
Number of applications
with links undrawn in
EC
EHESS PhD advisor 450 62 357 450 62 357
Other members of the PhD
committee
554 62 430 417 61 344
PhD  committee invitation
link
317 45 236 198 44 159
Coauthor 893 132 667 315 87 274
Same PhD advisor 595 87 473 338 72 297
Same discipline 55,059 6222 45,015 1998 1502 1982
Reference letters for EC 1603 133 1385 774 121 725
Viva  voce support in FA 4340 704 3203 798 436 758
Letters or viva voce 5422 806 4127 1165 516 1097
Letters or viva voce in t − 1 1608 171 1273 413 134 378
Note: 1603 reference letters were written for applicants: 133 from drawn members of the Electoral Commission (EC), 1385 from EHESS faculty undrawn in the electoral
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port are not completely independent from the random composition
of the electoral commission. If complete applications are not due
until after the electoral commission has been composed,7 decisions
5 It was not rare for some persons to apply without a PhD (like Pierre Bourdieu),
especially before 1985. Fourteen percent of the applications fell into this case. For
24  percent of the applicants, I could not ﬁnd any information on either the PhD or
their advisor.
6 Among those 419 applications, 90 percent are “inbred” applications of EHESS
PhDs, plus a minority of 10 percent of external applicants whose advisor was  hired
after their PhD was defended.ommission (EC). There were 774 applications with at least one letter from a m
ommission, and 725 with at least one from EHESS faculty undrawn in the electora
ample size could be restricted to the exams for which the most
nformation is available, but to do so could have a negative effect
n the statistical power of the study. In order to deal with issue, I
herefore check that the magnitude of the effects remains similar
hen we restrict it to the exam for which we have the most details.
The experimental design is well suited to accurately estimate
he effect of having randomly drawn contacts in the electoral com-
ission and to limit this to the population with contacts among
he members of the EHESS submitted to the random draw. Not all
pplicants fall into this case; some do not have contacts or do not
ave contacts among the EHESS faculty. I must therefore control for
hose applications outside the experimental framework in order to
roperly establish the social capital effect. A control variable for
ontacts’ membership to the EHESS will achieve this goal.
.3. The model
I therefore model the probability of success (for instance win-
ing a majority of votes at the electoral commission) as a function
f the number of contacts among the drawn members of the elec-
oral commission (drawn), the number of contacts among the ex
fﬁcio members of the electoral commission (exofﬁcio), the num-
er of contacts in the EHESS that do not belong to the electoral
ommission (undrawn), and a ﬁxed effect for each exam (examj).
(success) = a.drawn + b.exofficio + c.undrawn + examj + u (1)
The causal effect of having a contact in the electoral commission
s given by (a–c): the difference between drawn contacts (treat-
ent) and undrawn contacts (control). I can reformulate (1) in the
ollowing way, so that a′ = a-c is directly estimated:
(success) = a′.drawn + b′.exofficio + c.EHESS + examj + u (2)
ith EHESS = drawn + exofﬁcio + undrawn referring to all members
f the EHESS faculty.
Thus I control for applications outside the de facto experimen-
al setting, such as applicants whose contacts are outside EHESS
EHESS = 0) or are nonrandom members of the electoral commission
exofﬁcio). I will not interpret these variables, as I cannot correctly
dentify the underlying effect (effect of the contact or of unobserved
eterogeneity), but I use such variables to isolate the causal effect
f the random draw.In all estimations, I add an exam ﬁxed effect because each exam,
ith its speciﬁc degree of competition, is de facto one experiment,
here “treated” and “control” applicants compete against one
nother. To estimate “experimental exams” more accurately, I will of the faculty, 121 with at least one from EHESS faculty drawn in the electoral
ission.
restrict some estimates to exams where I ﬁnd both treated appli-
cants (
∑
(drawn) > 0) and control applicants (
∑
(undrawn) > 0).
3.4. Links studied
The following presents some details on the links I can investi-
gate for the 2209 applications for which I know both the members
of the electoral commission and the ranking produced during this
ﬁrst step of recruitment (Table 3). I collected the PhD advisor for
all applicants.5 419 applications out of 2209 had an advisor eligible
to the electoral commission and therefore can be included in the
experimental design estimating the causal inﬂuence of this speciﬁc
link.6 I also collected all PhD committees for defenses at the EHESS
from 1960 to 2005. I can therefore measure for the applications of
EHESS PhDs the impact of having other members of the PhD com-
mittee on the committee as titular members. Similarly, the more
senior applicants may  also have invited some EHESS colleagues to
be on the PhD committee of one of their students or have been
invited by them for the same reason. I consider this invitation rela-
tion to be a link when it occurs during the three years preceding
the application. I also study more indirect links based on common
characteristics, such as the impact of the number of persons with
whom the applicant shares the same PhD advisor or discipline.
A speciﬁc feature of the EHESS survey is that its archives con-
tain records of public acts of support, either as reference letters
examined during the electoral commission meeting or as viva voce
support in the faculty assembly. Unfortunately, reference letters
were either uncommon or irregularly recorded in the minutes of
the electoral commission before 1980, and viva voce support was
not recorded in the minutes of the faculty assembly at all between
1980 and 1993. Moreover, it is likely that these two  forms of sup-7 Unfortunately I do not always know the precise date the electoral commission
was  composed, and I generally do not know the date on which complete applica-
tions are due. At the end of the period, the composition of the electoral commission
could be decided anywhere from three to six months in advance of the electoral
commission meeting. Applications are generally due three months in advance of
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Table  4
Applications put forward by electoral commission and vote share in the electoral commission.
A. Applications put forward (linear probability models)
Applications whose PhD
advisor is:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Randomly drawn member
of  the EC
0.137** (0.062) 0.129* (0.066) 0.187*** (0.068) 0.220** (0.085) 0.215** (0.091) 0.139 (0.104)
Ex  ofﬁcio member of the EC 0.056
(0.076)
0.019 (0.072) 0.050 (0.081) −0.002 (0.107) 0.029 (0.089) 0.137 (0.189)
Member of EHESS 0.040 (0.029) 0.051* (0.027) 0.021 (0.030) 0.014 (0.035) 0.015 (0.036) 0.035 (0.055)
Competitive exam ﬁxed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field
All  competitive
exams
All competitive
exams
All
experimental
exams
All
experimental
exams with
composition
Asst. prof.
experimental
exams
Prof.
experimental
exams
Number of applications
[n1; n2]
2209
[357; 62]
2209
[357; 62]
991
[184; 55]
749
[143; 42]
563
[131; 33]
428
[53; 22]
B.  Vote share
Applicants whose PhD
advisor is:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Randomly drawn member
of  the EC
0.059 (0.039) 0.053 (0.039) 0.090** (0.040) 0.098* (0.050) 0.113* (0.057) 0.064 (0.051)
Ex  ofﬁcio member of the EC 0.088 (0.054) 0.05 (0.049) 0.077 (0.06) 0.094 (0.085) 0.017 (0.06) 0.293** (0.108)
Member of the EHESS 0.046** (0.019) 0.053*** (0.016) 0.036* (0.020) 0.041* (0.023) 0.043* (0.024) 0.022 (0.037)
Competitive exam ﬁxed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field  All competitive
exams
All competitive
exams
All
experimental
exams
All
experimental
exams with
composition
Asst. prof.
experimental
exams
Prof.
experimental
exams
Number of applications
[n1; n2]
2194
[357; 62]
2194
[357; 62]
991
[184; 55]
749
[143; 42]
563
[131; 33]
428
[53; 22]
Note: OLS estimates. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. n1 represents the number of applicants whose advisor was eligible but not drawn for the
electoral commission, n2 represents the number of applicants whose advisor was drawn for the electoral commission. Experimental exams refer to exams where I ﬁnd both
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ipplicants with undrawn contacts (n1 > 0) and applicants with drawn contacts (n2 >
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
o write or request support letters may  be modiﬁed by the ran-
om composition. Support for someone at the assembly that occurs
fter the result of the electoral commission may  be inﬂuenced by
hat happened during the commission’s meeting. Nevertheless,
or persons who repeat their application—a common feature, since
nly half of the applicants are recruited at their ﬁrst trial—the level
f support generated during previous trials is clearly independent
rom the random composition of the electoral commission.
.5. Checking the experiment’s validity
Before analyzing the results, I will address the classic question of
hether experimental conditions can modify behaviors and there-
ore bias the results of the experiment. The experiment in question
ere is not double-blind: the members of the electoral commission
now that the applicants they support have applied, and applicants
ay  know that their contacts are members of the electoral com-
ission. This knowledge might favor certain strategic decisions,
uch as whether to apply (if the electoral commission is consti-
uted before application), whether to withdraw an application, and
hether to attend the electoral commission meeting. I will analyzehis phenomenon with speciﬁc attention to the link considered by
revious literature as the most effective form of sponsorship: the
hD advisor–advisee link.8
his event. But reference letters can be sent up to a few days before the electoral
ommission meeting.
8 Table A1 in the appendix indeed shows that the PhD advisors are very involved
n  supporting their former advisees. When advisees apply, 39% of advisors writeStudying the question of whether the random draw modiﬁes
applicants’ behavior is difﬁcult, because this requires a larger pop-
ulation of potential applicants. I therefore use the larger population
of EHESS PhDs and analyze the probability that candidates with
PhDs from the EHESS will apply for the assistant professor exam
in each of the ﬁfteen years that follow the PhD defense. Table A2
shows that having one’s advisor randomly drawn for the electoral
commission does not substantially change the results. Having con-
tacts within the EHESS clearly affects whether one applies or not,
but the speciﬁc fact of having an advisor on or off the electoral
commission does not seem to have any impact.
It is easier to determine whether the knowledge of applications
inﬂuences the probability that an advisor will attend the electoral
commission meeting. Table A3 provides such an analysis, and we
can see that the experimental conditions are not totally met. The
probability that an advisor will attend the electoral commission
meeting increases signiﬁcantly when a former advisee applies. This
leads me to privilege here as well the composition of the electoral
commission (the intention to treat effect) rather than the effective
presence (the treatment on treated effect).
However, Table A4 shows that the random draw of the electoral
commission is independent from the characteristics of the appli-
cants, especially the ones predicting success at the electoral
commission stage. Being a native-born French national, holding a
prestigious higher degrees such as the École Normale Supérieure or
reference letters, 39% support them publicly in the faculty assembly, and 57% sup-
port them in either one way or the other.
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grégation, and having prior publications or previous applications
oes not affect the probability of whether an applicant’s PhD advi-
or will be on the committee. This result shows that the random
raw is not biased and that I can causally interpret the result with-
ut fearing some bias due to unobserved heterogeneity or reverse
ausality.9
. Results
.1. The advisor effect on the electoral commission
The descriptive statistics in Table A5 deliver the message of this
xperiment almost completely. For applicants whose advisors are
andomly drawn for the electoral commission, the rate of success
s 34 percent, with an average proportion of votes of 28 percent; by
ontrast, the success rate of the control group with undrawn advi-
ors is 20 percent, with an average proportion of votes of 22 percent.
n Table 4 (model 2), exam ﬁxed effects are included in order to
ake into account the fact that each exam is actually one experi-
ent. “Contact” is deﬁned here as an applicant’s PhD advisor being
andomly drawn as either a titular or substitute member of the elec-
oral commission. When the composition of the commission is not
nown (representing one-fourth of the cases), I use the presence of
he advisor at the electoral commission meeting. This choice repre-
ents a compromise between achieving the purity of a randomized
xperiment and maintaining the study’s statistical power. Further-
ore, I will show that the results still hold even if I restrict the
xperiment more precisely to the random conditions. I privilege
inear probability models in order to estimate dichotomous vari-
bles such as being put forward by the electoral commission, but
 also test these relationships with logistic regression (Table A6),
nding very similar results.10
The selection of the PhD advisor to the electoral commission
ncreases a former advisee’s probability of being put forward by
3 percentage points and increases the vote share by 5 percentage
oints (not signiﬁcant). The contrast between these two  results may
e due to the fact that a PhD advisor will mainly campaign in favor
f former advisees when the latter are near the majority threshold.
I restrict the model further (model 4 of Table 4) to just “exper-
mental exams” where applicants with drawn contacts and those
ith undrawn contacts compete.11 The advantage of having a con-
act inside the jury in this case increases the probability of being put
orward to 19 percentage points and the share of votes to 9 percent-
ge points. Part of this result could be biased, however, as I also use
xams where I only have presence (treatment on treated)  instead
f composition (intention to treat). Model 4 shows that the drawn
dvisor effect remains, and its magnitude even increases when
estricted only to exams for which I have the composition. Finally, I
stimate the advisor effect within two subpopulations: assistant
rofessors (Maîtres assistants and Maîtres de conférences) and
ull or joint professor exams (Directeurs d’études and Directeurs
’études cumulants). The advisor effect is much stronger and more
igniﬁcant for assistant professors (+22 percentage points in proba-
ility of being put forward, +11 percentage points in share of votes)
han for professors (+14 points in probability and +6 percent share
9 There is therefore no need to introduce control variables in the following regres-
ions.
10 There has been recent debate on the respective merits of logistic regression
nd  linear probability models (Mood, 2010; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Logistic
egression provides a better functional form, especially near the 0 or 1 borders, but
ts  constant variance may  call into question the comparison of parameters from one
egression to another.
11 Academic inbreeding inﬂates the parameter for undrawn EHESS contacts in
xams where no candidates have had contacts drawn, therefore shrinking the ﬁnal
ifference with candidates whose contacts were drawn.rks 46 (2016) 60–75
of votes), where it is lower and not signiﬁcant (although not very
far from the 10 percent threshold).
Two reasons could explain this difference, and both are very
similar to those found by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015). First, the
link to the former PhD advisor may  weaken as time passes after
completion of the PhD. Second, it might be easier during professor
exams to evaluate applicants on the basis of their scientiﬁc records
and their personal reputation, and voters might rely less on the
comments of those who know the applicant best.
In order to more thoroughly evaluate the advisor effect as well
as the difference between the intention to treat effect and the treat-
ment on treated effect, I restrict the sample to experimental exams
(as previously deﬁned), for which I know both the original com-
position of the committee and the presence of its members on the
day it meets (Table 5). The advisor effect is somehow higher when
I consider titular members initially drawn for the committee (+25
percentage points in probability of being put forward, +13 percent-
age points in share of votes) or advisors who  are ultimately present
on the electoral commission. This last treatment on treated effect
may  be biased for the reasons explained above, but we may  never-
theless be able to measure the treatment on treated effect by opting
for instrumental variables. In the ﬁrst-stage regression, I model the
probability that an applicant’s PhD advisor who has been drawn
for the commission will ultimately be present on the commission,
based on two strong instruments: being drawn as a titular member
and being drawn as a substitute. In the second-stage regression,
instead of using biased presence as the independent variable, I use
the prediction of presence based on the two  clearly random exoge-
nous instruments described above. The treatment on treated effect is
even higher, with 29 percentage points higher probability of being
put forward and 15 percentage points higher probability in share
of votes. This estimation could be an unbiased estimation of the
treatment on treated effect of the PhD advisor, provided that advi-
sors inﬂuence their colleagues only during the ﬁnal meeting of the
electoral commission.12
4.2. The advisor effect at various stages
How does the selection of the PhD advisor to the electoral com-
mission inﬂuence the recruitment process overall? In Table 6, I
estimate the different steps of the recruitment process based on
model 4 of Table 4—this paper’s favorite estimation combining
experimental accuracy and statistical power. I ﬁnd that randomly
drawn PhD advisors seem to have no inﬂuence on the president’s
support (in the name of the bureau) during the electoral com-
mission meeting. Instead, a PhD advisor probably inﬂuences other
colleagues: they get an average of 9 percent of the electoral com-
mission (equivalent to themselves and one other person) to vote
in favor of their former PhD candidates. This may  appear to some
as a rather limited inﬂuence, but we  must recall that members of
the electoral commission do not always support their former PhD
advisees; for some recruitment years, they might inﬂuence up to
two or three other people, a number that can be decisive for hir-
ing outcomes, especially when the application is near the majority
threshold.
The impact of the random composition of the electoral commis-
sion continues during the faculty assembly, the ﬁnal and decisive
step of the recruitment process. The selection of the PhD advisor
in the electoral commission increases by 0.6 the number of per-
sons speaking in favor of the applicant (nearly signiﬁcant), adds 6
percentage points to the share of votes (nearly signiﬁcant), and 13
12 The campaign aspect of the recruitment makes this last hypothesis question-
able. Members of the electoral commission who cannot make it to the commission
meeting may  try to inﬂuence their colleagues in advance.
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Table 6
The advisor effect on different steps of recruitment.
Explained variable PhD advisor
randomly drawn
effect
N
[n1; n2]
1. President’s support in electoral
commission
−0.018 (0.074) 711
[131; 47]
2.  Share of votes in electoral
commission
0.091** (0.04) 991
[184; 55]
3.  Number of votes in electoral
commission
2.06** (0.938) 991
[184; 55]
4.  Put forward in electoral
commission
0.187*** (0.068) 991
[184; 55]
5.  Number of viva voce supports in
faculty assembly
0.650 (0.421) 991
[184; 55]
6.  Vote share in faculty assembly 0.062 (0.041) 981
[181; 53]
7.  Number of votes in faculty
assembly
3.908 (3.836) 981
[181; 53]
8.  Election in faculty assembly 0.132** (0.06) 991
[184; 55]
Note: Each cell corresponds to a different regression (OLS estimates). The regres-
sions are similar to those used in Table 4. I show only the parameter of interest.
Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. n1 represents the number
of  applicants with an eligible advisor who was not drawn for the electoral com-
mission; n2, the number of applicants whose advisor was  drawn for the electoral
commission. Field: experimental exams with both treated (n2 > 0) and control appli-
cations (n1 > 0).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
percentage points to the probability of being elected (signiﬁcant).
These effects are essentially due to the better rank achieved during
the ﬁrst step because of the random selection of the PhD advisor to
the electoral commission.
4.3. Effects of other contacts
PhD advisors—the usual suspects in academic sponsoring—have
a clear effect on academic recruitment that cannot be due to some
form of unobserved assortative matching between themselves and
their former advisees. But are they the only personal contacts with
inﬂuence over the recruitment process? In Table 7, I analyze the
sponsoring effects of other possible contacts, whom I compare to
the PhD advisor.
Applicant’s coauthors—who sometimes are considered to be a
rather strong collaboration tie (Combes et al., 2008; Zinovyeva
and Bagues, 2015)—come in second in terms of magnitude. But
there is a lack of statistical power here, and the effect is not sig-
niﬁcant. This might be explained by the fact that within French
social science during the period, coauthoring remained rare and
socially heterogeneous (with an important fraction of coedited
books, which involve less collaboration, among the coauthored
publications).
Weaker links, such as other members of PhD committees or
members of the same discipline, do not seem to inﬂuence the
recruitment process. This negative result also tends to show
that advisors’ involvement is not just a question of thematic or
disciplinary similarity with their former advisee. Similarly, PhD
committee invitation links for professor exams do not have any
measured impact. But if I restrict the pool to external applications,
they then have a signiﬁcant positive impact on the share of votes.
At the professor level, one-third of the applications and 44 percent
of the applicants put forward are already assistant professors
at EHESS. For those applicants who are well integrated into the
EHESS institution, multiple channels of inﬂuence may  exist (such
as team and research center memberships). For more external
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Table 7
Different types of links and their causal effect on electoral commission decisions.
Effect of contact’s presence
on electoral commission
when contact is:
All Assistant professor exams Professor exams
Put forward Share of votes N
[n1; n2]
Put forward Share of votes N
[n1; n2]
Put
forward
Share of
votes
N
[n1; n2]
PhD advisor 0.187*** (0.068) 0.090** (0.040) 991
[184; 55]
0.215** (0.091) 0.113* (0.057) 563
[131; 33]
0.139
(0.104)
0.064
(0.051)
428
[53; 22]
Other  member of PhD
committee
−0.012 (0.066) −0.03 (0.033) 1102
[203; 61]
−0.070 (0.061) −0.065 (0.038) 597
[128; 30]
0.058
(0.116)
0.009
(0.054)
505
[75; 31]
PhD  committee invitation
link
−0.041 (0.088) −0.018 (0.058) 673
[93; 41]
– – – −0.038
(0.091)
−0.016
(0.06)
603
[92; 40]
Coauthor 0.062 (0.052) 0.019 (0.031) 1102
[158; 83]
0.094 (0.161) 0.082 (0.072) 380
[28; 11]
0.046
(0.055)
0.010
(0.033)
722
[130; 72]
Person  sharing the same
advisor
−0.055 (0.042) −0.025 (0.028) 1016
[175; 67]
0.010 (0.043) 0.017 (0.029) 544
[98; 32]
−0.159**
(0.073)
−0.092**
(0.044)
479
[77; 35]
Person  in the same
discipline
0.005 (0.006) 0.004 (0.004) 2170
[1960;
1493]
−0.009 (0.007) −0.002 (0.005) 972
[895; 693]
0.013
(0.010)
0.002
(0.007)
1198
[1065; 800]
Reference letter author for
electoral commission
0.068 (0.050) 0.014 (0.021) 1178
[549;
118]
0.002 (0.091) −0.007 (0.037) 572
[203; 42]
0.100*
(0.052)
0.028
(0.024)
606 [346;
76]
Viva  voce supporter in
faculty assembly
0.043* (0.022) 0.029** (0.011) 1335
[744;
434]
0.037 (0.035) 0.039** (0.019) 623
[285; 144]
0.042
(0.031)
0.023
(0.016)
712
[459; 290]
Letter  or viva voce
supporter
0.043** (0.020) 0.027*** (0.01) 1848
[1023;
511]
0.025 (0.031) 0.032* (0.017) 833
[379; 173]
0.049*
(0.027)
0.024*
(0.014)
1015
[644; 338]
Letter  or viva voce
supporter in previous
exams
0.086* (0.044) 0.052** (0.023) 1484
[308;
130]
0.155*** (0.052) 0.094** (0.037) 623
[105; 41]
0.071
(0.057)
0.043
(0.029)
861
[203; 89]
Note: Each cell corresponds to a different regression (OLS estimates). The regressions are similar to those used in Table 4. I show only the parameter of interest. Cluster-robust
standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. N represents the number of the number of applicants, n1 represents the number of applicants who have undrawn eligible contacts
in  the electoral commission, n2 the number of applicants who  have contacts drawn in the electoral commissions. Field: experimental exams with both treated (n2) and
control  applications (n1).
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declarations in the faculty assembly (57 percent of them do so; see
Table A1), the supporter effect is not just an advisor effect.
13 In fact, when I regress the probability for an EHESS scholar to support a given
applicant upon being selected for the electoral commission, I ﬁnd that commissionp < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
pplications, however, PhD links are a way of inﬂuencing and
ntering this institution.
A contact is generally expected to have a positive inﬂuence.
lthough balance theory has modeled for long the combination
f positive and negative ties, negative ties in organization and
abor markets have been until very recently overlooked (Labianca,
014). Competitors on small markets are likely to become such
egative ties, as their outcome is negatively correlated with ego’s
utcome. Hence, at the EHESS, I found a type of potential con-
act which produces negative outcome: when a contact had the
ame PhD advisor as the applicant. In professor exams, the ran-
om selection of this type of contact lowers the probability of
eing put forward by 16 percentage points and the share of votes
ollected by 9 percentage points. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015),
y contrast, do not ﬁnd any impact at all for this type of con-
act. This unusual result is likely speciﬁc to EHESS history and its
ecruitment procedures; EHESS was a central place for the recon-
truction of the social sciences in France during the second half
f the twentieth century. It was the locus for many burgeoning
nd often antagonistic schools of thought, with opposing scholars
oming from the same intellectual background who  often had the
ame advisors, in a fractal way (Abbott, 2001). This negative effect
ay therefore be due to the fact that, as PhD solidarity declines
ith time, EHESS members may  want to be their advisor’s only
ntellectual descendant and may  be reluctant to hire other rival
escendants.
I also focus on the efﬁciency of declared acts of support, written
etters of reference, or the public viva voce support of applicants
uring the faculty assembly. As stated above, the electoral com-
ission membership is put together before viva voce support
t the faculty assembly can be given, and letters may  be written
efore or afterward, meaning that both of these could plausiblybe inﬂuenced by the composition of the committee.13 While I
cannot claim to identify the causal effect properly, the results are
nevertheless suggestive. A letter supporter only has a signiﬁcant
effect on professor exams. A viva voce supporter helps on all types
of exams, and increases the share of votes at assistant professor
exams. Either form of support signiﬁcantly increases the proba-
bility of an applicant being put forward (all exams and professor
exams) and the share of votes (all exams assistant professor and
professor exams). Because the decision to support a candidate
is biased by the composition of the commission, I also consider
the possibility that past supporters of applicants who  repeat their
application after a failure are drawn for the commission, and hence
those supporters are not inﬂuenced by the random composition of
the electoral commission.14 Past supporters have a clear positive
and signiﬁcant causal effect both on the committee proposal
(ranging from 9 percentage points for all exams to 16 for assistant
exams) and on its share of votes (ranging from 5 percentage
points for all exams to 9 for assistant professor exams). This effect
remains signiﬁcant even when I control for the selection of the
advisor to the electoral commission. Although advisors are very
likely to actively support their applicants through letters or publicmembership signiﬁcantly decreases the probability of writing a reference letter but
signiﬁcantly increases the probability of publicly supporting an applicant during the
faculty assembly.
14 I successfully veriﬁed that there was no signiﬁcant correlation between these
acts  of support and being randomly selected for the electoral commission.
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. Concluding comments
Weber (2008) observed a long time ago that entering into
cademia and progressing further in an academic career is “a mat-
er of pure chance”. This article presents evidence that the chance
f having a supporter on a recruitment committee is a key ele-
ent of this chance. I identiﬁed former PhD advisors as among the
trongest potential sponsors, with an effect that can double or triple
 candidate’s odds of being put forward. This effect is similar to
he one found by Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) in their study of
 similar natural experiment in a different institutional setting: a
even-member disciplinary and national recruitment committee in
pain between 2002 and 2006.15 The striking convergence between
he two studies shows that the results can be extrapolated beyond
hese two cases to European academic labor markets. Moreover,
he results found in these quasi-experimental conditions are also
trikingly in line with previous non-experimental studies which on
heir own could not rule out unobserved heterogeneity or reverse
ausality. Hence, those possible biases ﬁnally do not lead here to an
verestimation of the effects of social capital in non-experimental
tudies as dramatic as the one feared by Mouw (2006).
.1. Possible underlying mechanisms
Although some applicants’ ties, such as those to a former PhD
dvisor, have a purely causal effect on the recruitment commit-
ee’s decision, the reasons underlying such involvement are still
ot clear. Several mechanisms may  contribute to it. First, advisors
nd advisees share similar scientiﬁc preferences, which are at the
asis of their PhD collaboration. Perhaps it is less about advisors
upporting persons they know than about supporting scientiﬁc
pproaches they like. A second mechanism in terms of informa-
ion and evaluation costs could lead to similar results: advisors are
lready well aware of what is interesting about their advisees’ work,
nd it is less costly to ﬁnd and promote the key points of these
pplicants than those of the applicants an advisor does not know.
owever, the fact that other members of the PhD committee do not
ave any effect, even when they may  share similar scientiﬁc pre-
erences and also be well acquainted with applicants’ work, would
uggest that these two  ﬁrst mechanisms are not that important.16
One could also suspect that the strong personal links to former
dvisees generate either subconscious or conscious judgment
iases. In the ﬁrst case, because advisors know and like their former
dvisees, they will subconsciously end up valuing their advisees’
cientiﬁc contribution. The second case could be seen as an example
f the classical “motivation” argument (Obukhova, 2012): advisors
eliberately support applicants they like, even though they may
eel that their advisees are not the best candidates. New research is
eeded in order to disentangle the respective power of these four
echanisms.
.2. A touchy issueAs noted previously, the impact of the advisor on academic
iring may  contribute to the importance of academic inbreeding,
15 They ﬁnd an advisor effect of 14 percentage points for all exams (18 for assis-
ant professor exams and 10 for professor exams) (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015,
able A1). Let us turn their results into an odds ratio for better comparability: In
pain, advisors’ selection to the committee multiplies the probability of success by
.6  (3 for assistants, 2.1 for professors). For EHESS, I ﬁnd an odds ratio of 2 (2.2 for
ssistants, 1.8 for professors) and 2.9 (3.5 for assistants, 2.3 for professors) when I
estrict to experimental exams (cf. logs given in Table A6).
16 It is true that members of the PhD committee (chosen in France at the end of
he  PhD) may  have fewer shared scientiﬁc preferences with the applicants and less
nowledge of their scientiﬁc contributions than PhD advisors.rks 46 (2016) 60–75 71
a feature common in many countries and strongly debated. At
EHESS, the random selection of applicants’ advisors to the elec-
toral commission causes ten more advisees to be put forward than
otherwise would have and contributes to one-third of the success
differential between inbred (22 percent) and external applicants
(16 percent). The probability for inbred applicants to have their
advisor on the EHESS recruitment committee is low (1 out of 8),
whereas in university departments, especially small ones, it is prob-
ably much higher and thus contributes much more to academic
inbreeding. The results could also have normative consequences for
public policy. Academic systems share (or are supposed to share)
the Mertonian ideal of meritocracy and indifference to personal
characteristics. Systematic bias in recruitment is prejudicial both
to the quality of the academic system and to its equity. On the
other hand, academia consists of small communities where people
know one another well. Excluding all persons with a potential bias
toward an applicant could lead to paralysis. Academic institutions
must arbitrage these two risks. One possible way  of coping with an
important fraction of possible bias without paralyzing recruitment
would be to ban the recruitment of inbred candidates, a practice of
most American universities since the 1980s (and most mathematics
departments in France since the early 2000s).
5.3. On the respective efﬁciency of strong and weak ties
Finally, this natural experiment furthers the debate on the efﬁ-
ciency of social capital and contacts in getting a job, as well as the
respective roles played by strong and weak ties. This article not
only shows that social capital clearly does matter (in contrast to
Mouw’s (2006) statement), but also that strong ties matter more
(undermining Granovetter’s (1973) and Lin’s (2001) predictions).
Here, a given strong tie like the PhD advisor is much more effective
than a given comparatively weak tie like the other members of the
PhD committee. While Lin predicts that stronger ties count more
for the success of “expressive action”, he maintains a “strength-
of-weak-tie” argument for “instrumental action”. The rationale for
his hypothesis is that the level and the heterogeneity of resources
embedded in a tie increases with its weakness. Through weak ties,
especially those serving as a bridge in the network, ego can access
complementary resources from people higher up in the hierarchy.
Two  reasons explain why Lin’s proposition fails in our case. The
ﬁrst lies in the mechanisms through which social capital enhance
outcomes of action. Although Lin (2001) considers inﬂuence to be
one of the four mechanisms of social capital (with ﬂow of infor-
mation, social credentials, and (self-insurance) reinforcement), he
does not derive the full conclusion of his ﬁnding for tie strength.
As inﬂuencing is much more involving than informing, it will not
be exercised by the tie without strong incentives to do so. Thus tie
strength is (along with direct personal interest) one of the bases of
this “motivation” (Obukhova, 2012; Chen and Volker, 2016). In our
case, we think inﬂuence plays the most important role.17 The sec-
ond reason has to do with conditionality. In the strength-of-weak
tie proposal, it is not the weakness per se that matters but rather
some features to which it is tied—such as resource heterogeneity
(Lin, 2001) or information novelty (Granovetter, 1973). But once
we hold those resources constant, the willingness for a tie to share
them with ego does not decrease anymore with the strength of
the tie; on the contrary, it begins to increase with it. In the case
studied here, comparing the impact of members of a recruitment
17 In the type of recruitment studied, it is difﬁcult to distinguish between inﬂu-
encing and credentialing (which is an important way  of inﬂuencing peer decisions).
The absence of job talks gives little space to self-insurance reinforcement. The fact
that  PhDs don’t apply more when their supervisor serves in the electoral committee
discards the effect of the information ﬂow from recruiter to candidate.
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ommittee, we hold constant one of their essential resources:
peaking and voting rights. This conditionality leads logically to a
trength-of-strong-tie result. However, these results are also in line
ith other studies on sponsoring in academia where tie strength
s not as conditioned on the resource provided (Godechot and
ouvet, 2010b). Consequently, we can hypothesize that even with-
ut conditioning on the resource provided, thanks to the inﬂuence
echanism, the efﬁciency of a given tie for getting a job in academia
s positively correlated with its strength.
Before inverting the Granovetterian formula (Krackhardt, 1992),
owever, we must add some nuances. The strength-of-strong-tie
esult found in this paper holds for a given tie. However, it does not
ell us anything about the aggregate effect of strong ties relatively
o weak ties. Recalling that the probability for a given tie to have an
ffective role in a recruitment committee is low—and that people
ave more weak ties than strong ties—we must balance (in terms of
athematical expectation) the strong inﬂuence of a lower number
f strong ties against the small inﬂuence of a much higher number
f weak ties.18
While these results are established for academia (especially
n France and Spain), one may  wonder whether they hold true
lso beyond this sector. Indeed as it grants recruitment power
o peers who are experts in precisely the type of work of
he candidates and who have some chance of having worked
ith candidates in the past, academia maximizes the opportu-
ities for strong tie inﬂuence. One could argue that the role of
able A1
ypes of contacts and supports.
Reference letters Public support in faculty assembly Either form of support
Percentage Links Percentage Links Percentage Links
EHESS PhD advisor 39% 404 39% 392 57% 235
Other  members of the PhD committee 16% 513 23% 478 31% 337
PhD  committee invitation link 16% 313 31% 225 41% 157
Coauthor  11% 1043 23% 604 28% 468
Same  PhD advisor link 8.3% 625 16% 472 24% 342
Same  discipline 1.6% 55,237 4.3% 48,641 5.1% 35,973
Reference  letters (100%) 1761 52% 1002 (100%) 1002
Viva  voce support in assembly 14% 3771 (100%) 4968 (100%) 3771
Letters  or viva voce 35% 5010 91% 5448 (100%) 4251
Letters  or viva voce in t − 1 27% 1646 39% 1610 49% 1348
All  faculty members 0.46% 383,467 1.44% 344,594 1.78% 239,147
able A2
robability for EHESS PhDs to apply depending on the advisor’s membership in the electoral commission.
Variables 1 (Logit) 2 (OLS)
Number of years since PhD 0.156** (0.073) 0.0007 (0.0006)
Squared number of years since PhD −0.022*** (0.006) −0.0001** (0.00004)
Advisor drawn member of the EC 0.184 (0.183) 0.003 (0.003)
Advisor ex ofﬁcio member of the EC −0.012 (0.227) −0.00008 (0.002)
Advisor member of the EHESS 0.403*** (0.101) 0.004** (0.0009)
Competitive exam ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Field  Asst. prof. exams Asst. prof. exams
Number of potential applications 41,530 41,530
ote: The probability of applying to an assistant professor competitive exam is modeled with logistic regression (1) and OLS (2). Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams)
n  parentheses.
inﬂuence is much weaker in corporate ﬁrms, where human
resources personnel with little work experience in an applicants’
ﬁeld hold a strong selection power. In such situations the infor-
mation ﬂow through which one hears about the job should count
more than the inﬂuence process. However in small ﬁrms, there is
usually no human resources service. Even in large ﬁrms—and espe-
cially in industries like ﬁnance where hiring is selective (Godechot,
2014)—the supervisors and their direct collaborators often hold
the actual recruitment power, while human resource departments
serve more as a support function in charge of establishing labor con-
tracts. On the one hand, direct hiring could pave way to inﬂuence.19
On the other hand, incentives to maximize the ﬁrm proﬁt might
mitigate this phenomenon. Future research efforts should mea-
sure the relative importance of these inﬂuence mechanisms. It is
likely that their magnitude increases not only with the level of dis-
connection between ﬁrms interest and personnel interest (Bian,
1997; Obukhova, 2012; Chen and Volker, 2016) but also with the
devolution of recruitment power to the team where the job is
offered, as well as with the level of turnover in the sector enabling
to resume past coworking ties (Levin et al., 2011; Godechot,
2014).
Appendix A.
Tables A1–A6.p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
ield: we  selected the population of EHESS PhDs who  completed their PhD during the ﬁf
t  the EHESS).
18 Limited statistical power prevented me  from identifying a signiﬁcant weak-tie
ffect in my  data (aside from the letters of viva voce supporters, which are more
ifﬁcult to interpret in terms of tie strength). But relying on Zinovyeva and Bagues
2015), I can make the following comparison: the advisor effect (+14 percentage
oints) is 4.5 times that of another member of the PhD committee. Since PhD com-
ittees have an average of four non-advisor members, the expected inﬂuence of the
ther members could reach that of the advisor.teen years preceding the EHESS exam (we excluded those who were already hired
19 According to PSID 1978 gross results, 60% of the respondents who thought
that  someone helped them for getting a job refer to an inﬂuence mechanism
(either direct, inferred or through recommendation) while 30% refer to an informa-
tion mechanism. When adding those who  transmitted information without being
viewed as help, we ﬁnd that inﬂuence and information have the same magnitude.
Cf.  PSID 1978 Codebook. ftp://ftp.isr.umich.edu/pub/src/psid/codebook/FAM1978
codebook.pdf
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Table  A3
Probability of attending the electoral commission meeting.
Variables 1 (Logit) 2 (OLS)
Drawn substitute member −1.405*** (0.146) −0.306*** (0.031)
Ex  ofﬁcio member 1.06*** (0.154) 0.146*** (0.021)
With  at least one PhD advisee applying 0.918** (0.404) 0.133*** (0.048)
Drawn substitute member with at least
one PhD advisee applying
0.386 (0.884) 0.053 (0.207)
Ex  ofﬁcio member with at least one PhD
advisee applying
1.172** (0.459) 0.093*** (0.023)
Competitive exam ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Field  All competitive exams with composition
and presence
All competitive exams with composition
and presence
N  2820 2820
Note: The probability of attending the electoral commission is modeled both through a logistic regression (column 1) and an OLS model. Cluster-robust standard errors (by
exams) in parentheses. The reference category is drawn titular members.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
Table A4
Probability of being put forward by the electoral commission and probability of having one’s PhD advisor drawn for the electoral commission.
Put forward by EC Advisor drawn in EC
Variables 1
(Logit)
2
(OLS)
3
(Logit)
4
(OLS)
Woman −0.268 (0.164) −0.028* (0.016) −0.119 (0.491) −0.006 (0.085)
Born  outside France −0.434** (0.201) −0.042** (0.019) −0.152 (0.702) −0.013 (0.109)
École  Normale Supérieure
alumni
0.574*** (0.222) 0.093*** (0.032) 0.829 (0.925) 0.152 (0.158)
Agrégation (High school
professor exam)
0.491** (0.206) 0.052* (0.026) −0.244 (0.968) −0.025 (0.159)
Already  member of the EHESS 0.93 *** (0.172) 0.124 *** (0.022) −0.631 (0.7) −0.149 (0.141)
Age  −0.045*** (0.013) −0.005 *** (0.001) −0.0003 (0.045) 0.0002 (0.009)
Anthropology 0.21 (0.222) 0.021 (0.025) 0.463 (0.962) 0.074 (0.137)
History 0.291* (0.165) 0.031 (0.019) 0.522 (0.749) 0.089 (0.117)
Sociology 0.011 (0.221) −0.009 (0.023) 0.401 (0.916) 0.066 (0.134)
Economics 0.095 (0.272) 0.008 (0.031) 0.663 (1.311) 0.081 (0.24)
Number of previous trials 0.487*** (0.173) 0.058*** (0.018) −0.525 (0.622) −0.086 (0.107)
Square  number of previous
trials
−0.034 (0.026) −0.004 (0.003) 0.105 (0.109) 0.02 (0.018)
Number of publications 0.018*** (0.004) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.015 (0.033) 0.002 (0.004)
Competitive exam ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field  All competitive exams All competitive exams All competitive exams.
Applications with
advisor at EHESS
drawn or undrawn
All competitive exams.
Applications with
advisor at EHESS
drawn or undrawn
N  2171 2171 418 418
Note: The probability of being put forward is modeled both through a logistic regression (column 1) and an OLS regression. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in
parentheses. The reference category is Ex ofﬁcio members (member of the bureau or the scientiﬁc council).
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
Table A5
Applications put forward by the electoral commission and average share of votes depending on the advisor’s membership in the electoral commission.
Applications whose PhD
advisor is
Put forward Share of votes Put forward Share of votes Put forward Share of votes
% N Mean
(s.d.)
N % N Mean
(s.d.)
N % N Mean
(s.d.)
N
Randomly drawn member of
the EC
34% 62 28.1% (0.334) 62 37 % 54 31.3% (0.345) 54 38% 48 30% (0.329) 48
Member of the EHESS outside
electoral commission
20% 357 22.1% (0.262) 357 20 % 365 21.8% (0.26) 365 20% 371 22.1% (0.265) 371
Member of the EC as a member
of scientiﬁc council
31% 13 30.4% (0.307) 13 31 % 13 30.4% (0.307) 13 31% 13 30.4% (0.307) 13
Member of the EC as member
of the bureau
22% 18 31.2% (0.323) 18 22 % 18 31.2% (0.323) 18 22% 18 31.2% (0.323) 18
Outside EHESS 16% 1759 17.5% (0.269) 1744 16 % 1759 17.5% (0.269) 1744 16% 1759 17.5% (0.269) 1744
All  applications 17% 2209 28.1% (0.334) 2194 17 % 2209 31.3% (0.345) 2194 17% 2209 30% (0.329) 2194
Deﬁnition of the membership
the electoral commission
Drawn as titular member or substitute
(if available, presence otherwise)
Drawn as titular member (if available,
presence otherwise)
Presence (if available, composition
otherwise)
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Table A6
Applications put forward by electoral commission depending on the membership of the electoral commission.
Applications whose PhD
advisor is:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Randomly drawn member
of  the EC
0.707** (0.295) 0.736** (0.359) 1.082*** (0.379) 1.251*** (0.463) 1.253** (0.52) 0.827 (0.546)
Ex  ofﬁcio member of the EC 0.32 (0.405) 0.168 (0.509) 0.42 (0.616) 0.019 (0.899) 0.232 (0.728) 1.222 (1.088)
Member of EHESS 0.272 (0.177) 0.403** (0.193) 0.202 (0.271) 0.133 (0.294) 0.169 (0.376) 0.257 (0.374)
Competitive exam ﬁxed
effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field  All competitive
exams
All competitive
exams
All experimental
exams
All experimental
exams with
composition
Asst. prof.
experimental
exams
Prof. experimental
exams
Number of applications
[n1; n2]
2209
[357; 62]
2209
[357; 62]
991
[184; 55]
749
[143; 42]
563
[131; 33]
428
[53; 22]
Note: Logistic regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors (by exams) in parentheses. n1 represents the number of applicants whose advisor was eligible but not drawn in the
electoral  commission, n2, the number of applicants whose advisor was  drawn in the electoral commissions. Field: experimental exams with both treated (n2 > 0) and control
applications (n1 > 0).
* p < 0.1.
R
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
E
E
E
F
F
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
H
H
H** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
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